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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 001394

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015

TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, JUNE 2, 2005

REF: GENEVA 1387 (JCIC-XXVII-015)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-019.

[1](#)2. (U) At a U.S.-hosted reception, held on June 2 at the U.S. Mission, Delegation members engaged the other participating Delegations' members from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine on various topics under discussion in the JCIC. Those conversations are reported below.

THANKS FOR THE LAWYERS

[1](#)3. (S) Dunn spoke with Sorokina regarding work in the first half of JCIC-XXVII. She confirmed that the only items she was aware of that were to be completed were the Bulava documents, the draft Agreement on Replacement of RDE, the draft S-Series joint statement on Zlatoust, and possibly some work on Ground Transportation formats. She did not indicate that there was anything else the Russian Delegation was going to raise. She also commented on how helpful it was to have a lawyer on their Delegation, stating that was something she had pushed for after the last session (based in part on the U.S. request that Russia have a lawyer available). She said it made it much quicker to get things done.

[1](#)4. (S) On other topics, Sorokina indicated to Dunn that it was her impression that the Russians are committed to the June 28-30 Working Group One (WG-1) meetings (they already have their logistics confirmed, and are arriving June 27), and are fully expecting the United States to show.

BULAVA

[1](#)5. (S) Foley asked Ryzhkov when the flight-test for the Bulava could be expected. Would it be conducted before the end of this year? Ryzhkov answered that it would probably occur after the conversion of all the launchers on the Typhoon had been completed. He stated that this is a different system and that a non-standard process was being undertaken to get it tested and deployed. He allowed as to how the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement problem would have to be addressed, but conducting the initial flight is the imperative at this time.

[1](#)6. (C) Fedorchenko told Singer, Page and Foley that Russian experts believed that, from a statistical perspective, data from a minimum of three RSM-56 flight-tests would be needed to accurately calculate the missile's throw-weight.

SS-25 ELIMINATIONS

[1](#)7. (S) Venevtsev asked Foley why the United States does not consider the SS-25s as eliminated. The Russian view is that they will never fly again and, therefore, Russia considers them eliminated. Foley responded that the Treaty describes certain procedures for the elimination of mobile ICBMs. In the case of the recent SS-25 eliminations, those procedures had not been completed, specifically for the SCDM and nozzles. Accordingly, the United States considers that the status of the four ICBMs remains open. He added that there are significant differences of Treaty interpretation on this matter and, until they are resolved, the situation must remain open. Venevtsev asked whether there could be common ground on the SCDM issue and suggested that the upper section in dispute could be presented for inspectors to view and then removed, but it would not be eliminated. Foley responded that removal of the electronic devices and elimination of the airframe containing those devices would provide a basis for consideration. Venevtsev did not indicate any enthusiasm for such an outcome. Foley stated that it was hard to understand why those devices could not be removed from the airframe

without damaging them, but Venevtsev only responded that the system was designed in that fashion. Venevtsev expressed concern that the eliminations not be slowed down or halted as a result of this dispute, because the backlog would create serious problems with plans for elimination of the SS-25 force. Foley replied that the Parties needed to find a solution.

18. (S) Johnston had essentially the same conversation with Venevtsev on SS-25 elimination. Venevtsev suggested that it would remove the issue, it was his view that Russia could make the guidance and control section available for viewing. However, Russia had no intention of destroying the unit.

19. (S) Buttrick asked Bolotov and Smirnov how soon it would be before U.S. inspectors would encounter burned-out first-stage rocket motors during SS-25 ICBM elimination inspections. Smirnov said he anticipated that it could occur in the next batch of SS-25 eliminations, which should take place the last two weeks in July. Bolotov said that he had developed the proposed procedures for measuring the exterior of the first-stage rocket motor in order to assist U.S. inspectors in determining the type of ICBM that was being eliminated during inspections. Buttrick thanked Bolotov for suggesting this proposal, and said that it would be a helpful proposal for Washington to consider. Buttrick said that he believed issues were easier to work in JCIC channels when Russia provided information to the United States in advance. It is more difficult to work an issue when U.S. inspectors are surprised during inspections. For example, if Russia could have provided more information about its plans prior to the first SS-25 elimination inspection, perhaps U.S. inspectors would not have had such a difficult time during the inspection. Buttrick said that it was a complete surprise to the United States that Russia had not planned to eliminate the entire section of the missile forward of the SCDM, and aft of the front section. Bolotov said that this section of the missile was important for sustaining the remainder of the SS-25 ICBM force in the future. Buttrick said that, since the Treaty clearly requires that the SCDM and the front section of the SS-25 be eliminated, it is only logical that the guidance and control section should be eliminated as well. Smirnov said that Russia understands the U.S. position, but believes that Paragraph 2 of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol allows Russia to remove this system before the missile is eliminated. Buttrick said that Washington would be reviewing this issue before the next elimination inspection.

110. (C) Smirnov told Singer and Page that Russia wants to retain intact SS-25 guidance and control sections so they can be used as spare parts. He explained that there is almost nothing in those sections that can be serviced, and that they are essentially line replaceable units. Many of the devices in the guidance and control section are miniaturized, and they are mounted in such a way that it would be nearly impossible to remove them from the airframe without breaking them. Fedorchenko claimed that it has been Russia's understanding all along that it would be permitted to remove and retain the guidance and control sections intact. Smirnov reiterated that they have a few more SS-25s to eliminate that have been the subject of experiments. He believed that our concerns over the elimination of SS-25 nozzles will be resolved after those missiles are eliminated, because the subsequent nozzles will be presented intact for elimination. He was adamant, however, that providing photographs of the nozzles for U.S. inspectors to use during elimination inspections would be "excessive."

111. (S) Look noted to Boryak that Russia had informed the United States during this JCIC session of an additional complication in SS-25 eliminations, namely that the length of some SS-25 first-stages would be altered by the process of burning the fuel. Russia had proposed a unilateral Russian statement to acknowledge this situation and provide for a different length measurement of these stages. Look stated that he did not have guidance on this question and would need to take the proposal back to Washington for consideration. Hence, this issue could not be addressed during this part of JCIC-XXVII. Look stated that, although he could not state how Washington would respond to the substance of the Russian proposal, he believed that procedurally any document on this subject would need to be done jointly, thereby recording a mutual solution to this problem. Boryak stated that he agreed that the problem would only be resolved by a joint agreement of some kind.

112. (C) Smirnov told Singer, Page and Foley that he expected burn-through to be a problem only for the end domes of SS-25 solid rocket motors that had their propellant removed by low pressure burning. He explained that the cylindrical portion of the motor casing was reinforced, and that the end domes were substantially weaker. This is why he believes that the new Russian proposal to confirm missile type in such cases by measuring the length of the cylindrical section of the first stage will be a good solution. He reiterated that we must

reach agreement as quickly as possible on procedures for confirming type for SS-25s that have been shortened in length by burning, because Russia has begun to prepare several such missiles for elimination.

113. (C) Johnston asked Venevtsev about the meeting on SS-25 elimination where Venevtsev had interjected a correction to what the Russian interpreter (Yevarovskaya) had said. Had Fedorchenko said that the guidance and control section of the SS-25 was part of the SCDM, or had the interpreter made a mistake. Venevtsev said that the interpreter had made a mistake. He added that the Russian Delegation was very dissatisfied with her work. She routinely did not translate much of what was spoken in Russian into English. It was hard for the Russian Delegation to understand this, given that she had spent some time in New York translating at the UN.

SECOND PART OF JCIC-XXVII

114. (C) Boryak told Look that he thought a week would be enough for the concluding, second part of this JCIC session. Look said that he saw nothing developing that would take any longer. Boryak went on to say that the Ukrainians had asked him about the timing and duration for the second part of the session and had told him that they had some agenda item they wanted to discuss that might require more than a week to conclude. Boryak did not know the topic that Ukraine had in mind. Look stated that he would talk directly with the Ukrainians about it.

FUTURE OF START

115. (S) Venevtsev asked Foley about U.S. views on the future of START and whether it should be extended or somehow adapted to cover the three-year interval between expiration of START and expiration of the Moscow Treaty, or whether a new treaty should be pursued and who should be party to it. Foley responded that the United States had not begun its deliberations on that subject yet, but eventually we would begin such a process.

116. (S) Venevtsev and Kashirin asked Buttrick whether the United States had considered extending the START Treaty beyond 2009. Buttrick said that the issue had not yet been discussed in Washington, but the policy community was aware that this was an issue that needed to be discussed sooner rather than later. Buttrick asked whether the issue had been discussed in Moscow. Venevtsev said that it had not. He said that this would be a controversial issue among different agencies in the Russian Government. Buttrick said he expected that the same would be true in the U.S. Government. Buttrick asked Venevtsev if he envisioned the Treaty to be extended as a five-party Treaty or if it should be a modified Treaty that would continue with certain provisions of the old START Treaty. Venevtsev emphatically stated that any future Treaty on strategic offensive arms should only apply to Russia and the United States, and that non-nuclear weapons states should not be a part of it. Additionally, he believed that only a few of the inspection/verification provisions should be brought forward. Kashirin asked Buttrick whether the U.S. Senate would need to ratify the extended Treaty. Buttrick said he believed that the Senate would have to give its advice and consent on any changes that were made to the START Treaty as it exists today. Kashirin said he believed that this could pose significant problems for extending the Treaty.

117. (C) Grinevich asked Miller if he worked for the Ministry of Defense. In an effort to elicit Miller's opinion on the future of START, Grinevich offered that he thought START had accomplished its purpose. Miller agreed that many objectives of START had been met and that the Parties would have to begin discussing the future of START at least a couple years ahead of 2009. Grinevich stated that it was up to us to determine whether START is extended, i.e., the United States, because all issues relative to his country were resolved.

SS-24 ELIMINATION BY JAPAN OR SWEDEN?

118. (S) Shevtsov told Mullins that both Japan and Sweden had expressed interest in assisting Ukraine in the elimination of their SS-24 solid-rocket motors. He said that both countries desired to be a partner with the United States, if the United States provided additional assistance. Shevtsov said Ukraine wanted to eliminate the solid-rocket motors before 2009, when the Treaty ends; however, if Ukraine had to finance the elimination of the rocket motors by themselves, he did not believe they would be able to make that deadline.

TRIDENT MANEUVERS

119. (S) An exchange of pleasantries by Yegorov and Foley about the good old days in the SCC abruptly morphed into the question of Trident maneuvers. Yegorov and Fedorchenko made the usual assertions to Foley that they were procedures for dispensing. Foley answered that they were not such procedures, they were made for range safety purposes, and

were not Treaty violations. The U.S. position was well-known on this and had not changed. A short discussion about RSM-56 flight-testing plans with Fedorchenko produced the expected reply that one could occur by the end of the year after conversion of the Typhoon launchers.

ZLATOUST AND RDE SHOULD BE READY TO GO

120. (S) Kottmyer confirmed with Kotkova that the U.S.-proposed text on the S-Series Joint Statement regarding the site diagram changes at the Zlatoust facility for suspect-site inspections was acceptable to the Russian Federation. Kotkova confirmed that Russia would provide a joint draft text as soon as possible so that the Parties could proceed to conforming. With respect to the ad-ref JCIC Agreement on replacement of radiation detection equipment, Kottmyer provided Kotkova with a markup of the English text showing the minor editorial points where the Russian ad-ref text differed. Kotkova said that Russia would correct its ad-ref text and provide the United States with a new version. Specifically, she confirmed that "spare" batteries would be acceptable, as opposed to "replaceable."

"ALTERNAT" AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

121. (S) Kottmyer informed Kotkova of the fact that the Treaty Office in Washington had been consulted on the way the JCIC completes the "alternat" for its documents. Kottmyer said she had followed up on a comment Kotkova had made at the conforming meeting held on June 1. Kotkova had questioned Kottmyer on the JCIC method of completing documents. She pointed out that it did not appear to be done in strict conformity with treaty practice. She pointed to the example of the Moscow Treaty, where the Russians received an English and Russian version with Russia listed first, and the United States received an English and Russian version with the United States listed first. In the JCIC, however, there are two versions prepared of each document: an English version with the United States listed first, and a Russian version with the FSU Parties listed first in alphabetical order. Kottmyer said that State L/T advised that, since these documents were not treaties and the START Parties had established a long-standing practice (12 years and over 100 documents), it was not critical for normal treaty practice to be strictly followed, and that the established practice should continue with no modification. Kotkova agreed, and thanked Kottmyer for checking with the treaty experts.

122. (C) Sorokina and Johnston talked about accreditation of BIC and JCIC Delegation members. Sorokina said that nothing new had occurred since the Delegations met in October. Russia had not had any difficulty getting visas this time because they worked directly with the Swiss in Moscow. It was the Russian view that Russia and the United States should approach the Swiss jointly to ask for accreditation. Johnston said that the Swiss had provided a note saying they would provide privileges and immunities for BIC members, but would not issue the identity cards. It was his view, however, that this was only someone's word and may not be a formal Swiss Government position. If there were a real problem, some form of written proof that we had these privileges and immunities would certainly be required.

TELEMETRY

123. (C) Razumov told Singer he was not aware of the April U.S. F144 NRRC notification informing Russia that we had resolved the cyclical synchronization problem with some Russian missile flight-test telemetry recordings raised informally by the U.S. at the last JCIC session. Singer explained the cause of the problem and thanked him for Russia's efforts to find a solution. Razumov said he hoped we would continue to try to resolve these types of problems through cooperation at the working level. Although Russia does not plan to raise any telemetry issues during Part I of JCIC-XXVII, Razumov said they intend to discuss the March 12, 2003 Peacekeeper flight-test during Part II.

MMIII AND TRIDENT RVOSI ISSUES

124. (C) Ryzhkov further explained to Emig the Minuteman (MM) III RVOSI example that he had cited during the Heads of Delegation meeting on that subject (REFTEL). He said that a cone-shaped RV cover was placed in the viewing area, apparently covering an RV. A gust of wind blew, possibly through a crack or gap in the van, and moved the cover, revealing that there was no RV beneath the cover. Ryzhkov appeared to suggest that the U.S. was hiding something. When asked what he thought would solve this MM III issue, he said the United States must completely change its method of presenting the front section, citing the example of Peacekeeper. Emig commented that it sounded like they would prefer that the United States leave the front section in the silo rather than lift it up into the van. Ryzhkov said he thought that might be a step in the right direction. Emig pointed out that the current MM III RVOSI procedures allow them to see more than if we left the front section in the silo. Jones asked if they thought a demonstration, similar

to the Trident II, was needed to resolve this issue. Ryzhkov said he thought it might be useful.

¶25. (C) Ryzhkov told Emig that, for all intents and purposes, the Trident II RVOSI issue was resolved. He expressed his personal opinion that the concluding agreement should not be too specific, but simply spell out the procedures. He thought the new procedures would eventually resolve their concerns.

¶26. (U) Look sends.
Moley